JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ne of the perhaps most striking phenomenological facts about the human perceptual experience of the world is that it seems to be divided into modes. } ± Our perceptions of the world are delivered to us in distinct classes, those of the separate sensory modalities, such as vision, hearing, and touch. When confronted with, say, a horse after a ride on a hot summer's day, we experience vivid impressions of the animal in the form of how it looks (large and brown), how it sounds (loud, heavy breathing), how it feels to the touch (hot and slick with sweat), and so on. That these different modes of experience are, well, different seems beyond question. The existence of separate sensory modalities would seem to be a brute fact about perception, if ever there were one.
trality is what makes it simultaneously b oth a difficult and a crucial question: Exactly what is it that distinguishes the senses from one another? I. INTRODUCTION
My goal here is two-fold. First, I want to bring attention to this underexplored topic-to bring together much of what little has already been written on it and, in doing so, to encourage others to take up the challenge it represents. Second, I want to propose an answer to the question. The answer is based on the criteria used in neuroethology, one of the sciences that daily confronts issues related to distinguishing, comparing, and contrasting sensory modalities. Distinguishing the senses in a way useful to those sciences which study perception requires knowledge of several factors, including the categories of physics, as well as the neurobiology, evolutionary biology, and behavior of the organism whose senses are to be distinguished. On my account, to possess a genuine sensory modality is to possess an appropriately wired-up sense organ that is historically dedicated to facilitating behavior with respect to an identifiable physical class of energy. Perhaps the correct way to think about modality is best suggested by a definition of the term in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary: "One of the main avenues of sensation (as vision)À ." Modality is an "avenue into" an organism. Question: What travels on an avenue? Answer: information about the physical state of the world exterior to the central nervous system (CNS). What constitutes an "avenue"? An evolutionary dedicated sense organ that convert@ s energy into nerve impulses and conveys those impulses to the CNS. This captures the original sense of the term: the different senses are different "modes" of perceptual interaction with the world.
I shall leave further discussion of my proposed answer to sections ii (where I discuss how to set up the problem of distinguishing the senses) and III (where I present my proposal in detail). Perhaps surprisingly, I shall argue that the distinct experiential qualities of perception-the qualia-so central to the common-sense understanding of perception are simply nonstarters for a scientific understanding. I draw a similar conclusion about the most venerable theory of the senses: Aristotle's account of the senses in terms of the "proper objects of sensation." In section Iv, I shall turn my attention to these prima facie plausible proposals in order to show how they fail to provide a firm foundation for an empirically adequate account of sensory differentiation.
Both the Aristotelian and the qualia-based approaches are best thought of as representing common-sense accounts of the senses.
Although they may well be adequate for this purpose, this is not my goal. To the contrary, I offer what might be termed a "thoroughly naturalized" approach to distinguishing the senses-one that proposes to make sense of the problem as it presents itself to the perceptual sciences. Therefore, one way of looking at what I do here is to provide an eliminative materialist theory of the sensory differentiation as an alternative to common-sense theories.
Before In discussing this topic with colleagues, I have discovered a surprising amount of unrecognized disagreement among individuals. Some believe that the problem is intimately tied up with qualitative experience, to the extent that a "nonconscious sensory modality" is seen as an oxymoron. To have a sense is to have a unique set of experiences-qualia-associated with that sense. But others see the issue as much more related to the sorts of things in the world which can affect behavior, regardless of whether we are ever consciously aware of such influence. For example, they feel that we would be right to posit a human magnetic sense if people could be shown to respond behaviorally to magnetic stimuli in a systematic fashion regardless of whether we experience "magnetic qualia." Still others insist that the senses are strictly related to sense organs; for example, refusing to accept the existence of a genuine "vestibular sense" until informed of the existence of the semicircular canals and associated cranial nerves. "No organ, no sense" seems to be their rule.
These differing intuitions agree on Aristotle's five senses, so people tend not to notice their different intuitions. Such apparently widespread agreement reinforces the strength with which these intuitions are held. After echoing the sentiment that the differentiation of the senses have "seldom been directly discussed,"J. W. Roxbee Cox3 goes on to diagnosis this curious condition by supposing that it may be "due to the fact that certain answers have seemed to different people so obvious that they did not need to be supported by argument" (ibid., p. 530). The disagreement among individuals begins to become clear once we start considering potential senses in addition to Aristotle's five, examples of which I shall be discussing below. What makes the problem of discriminating the senses philosophically interesting is that the intuitions here are fundamental, firm, and generally unrecognized by the people who hold them. When one finds a disagreement with these three qualities, it is a clarion call for philosophical inquiry.
That I shall argue that qualia are not central to differentiating the senses indicates one important philosophical payoff from the topic under discussion here. The legitimacy of the concept of qualia in our scientific understanding of the mind is a matter of ongoing contro- This would seem to be the additional "contribution of the organism" required by the discussion of (1). It also matches well with some of our naive notions of modality individuation; that is, we individuate our modalities in part on the basis of our sense organs. As Arm- Part of what it means to have a modality is to be able to make behavioral discriminations within that modality. Once again, the suggestion of this individuating criterion generates further individuation requirements. To wit, how ought we individuate "behaviors?" For example, it seems odd to identify tanning as a behavior. My plan here is simply to follow Fred Dretske16 on this issue: "behavior is endogenously produced movement, movement that has its causal orià"á gins within the system whose parts are moving" (ibid., p. 2). Tanning is something that happens to a person, not something one does. On the other hand, pressing a button or vocalizing are paradigmatic behaviors.
The science that is arguably most invested Šñ0 in the study of the relationship between behavior and the senses is the science of psychophysics. In his Sensory Qualities, Austen Clark'7 wields the impressive conceptual and empirical framework of psychophysics to ground an account of qualitative appearances which is materialist in spirit and which answers a variety of philosophical questions concerning the nature of appearances. Furthermore, he proposes that psychophysics alone has the resources to individuate the sensory modalities. For this reason, I shall now go into that proposal in some detail to show why the behavior criterion taken alone is insufficient to differentiate the senses.
Central to Clark's account is the psychophysical concept of "matching" (taken originally from Goodman's). "Matching" is the relation between two stimuli that differ physically but are nonetheless in principle indiscriminable from one another. For example, two color patches might reflect slightly different wavelengths of light, but differ so minutely that any human subject would report that the two patches are perceptually identical. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that the matching relation is nontransitive: stimulus A may match stimulus B, and stimulus B match stimulus C, but stimulus A need not match stimulus C. Using this relationship, one can construct "matching spans" of stimuli in which each stimulus matches its immediate neighbors, but the ends of the spans are easily discriminable.19 For example, we can construct such matching spans for color, creating a series of stimuli that vary infinitesimally by wavelength from red to green, say. A given observer, when presented with any two adjacent elements from this series, will be unable in principle to discriminate them, even though she can clearly distinguish red from green (the ends of the matching span). This is only a tiny fraction of the story Clark tells, but it is all we need to understand his proposal for individuating modalities (also taken from Goodman):
Facts about matching can individuate modalities. Sensations in a given modality are connected by the matching relation. From any sensation in the given modality, it is possible to reach any other by a sufficiently long series of matching steps. Distinct modalities are not so connected. One can get from red to green by a long series of intermediaries, each matching its neighbors; but no such route links red to C-sharp (op. cit., pp. 140-41).
There are two problems with Clark's proposal. First, on this account of modality individuation, we get many more modalities than we might have otherwise thought. Clark's account would entail breaking up the modalities into many submodalities, for not only can you not get from red to C-sharp (thus demarcating vision from audition), you also cannot get from red to "moving left to right across the visual field" (or however motion sensations ought to be described), nor from C-sharp to "darn that's as loud as a 747 engine from ten feet away" (or however auditory intensity sensations ought to be described). Lacking the appropriate matching relationships, there is no reason to class the "color" and "motion" submodalities of vision as both being submodalities of vision. We are left with an account that makes "color" and "motion" as distinct from one another as each is distinct from "pitch." Such an account fails to provide the resources for grouping together as "the same modality" sensory qualities that we would intuitively group together. All Clark é ÿÿ has shown us is how to individuate submodalities.
Second, Clark's account attributes the wrong modalities to the wrong organisms. For example, using (3) alone, humans would have an electrical modality! Consider the following: humans are easily capable of discriminating fully charged nine-volt batteries from "dead" ones, simply by sticking them to the tongue. Nine volts is more than enough electricity to stimulate the sensory cells of the tongue. You could do all sorts of interesting psychophysical studies of human electrical discrimination. Yet it seems absurd to claim that humans have an electrical modality, at least not in the same sense as electric fish are thought to. Something more is needed than simply a capacity to discriminate behaviorally stimuli of a certain physical type. We need some acknowledgement of the function of the alleged sensory modality in the species under consideration. Dedication, a concept taken from the science of neuroethology,20 is an attempt to make relevant what is biologically important to an organism. Just because a particular individual can behaviorally respond to a particular class ½ö@ of stimuli does not give us warrant to propose a modality for sensing that class of stimuli. In the example above, the reason why it is absurd to attribute an electrical modality to humans is that, as a species, we do not go around using this electrical capacity of our tongues to sense the electrica l properties of the world. Electric fish, on the other hand, detect the electrical properties of their world all of the time. It allows them to navigate the nearly opaque environment of the tropical waterways in which they live. It allows them to carry out a nocturnal lifestyle, which in turn gives them a fitness advantage over nonelectroreceptive fish.21 Neuroethologists, neurobiologists who study the evolution and neural basis of animal behavior, make a distinction that is useful here. The suffix -detection is applied to any organism that is capable of responding, by any means, to the presence of a particular type of stimulation in the environment. The suffix -reception is reserved for those organisms which carry out such sensory discriminations through the use of a dedicated anatomical system of structures. So, they would say that whereas electric fish are capable of electroreception-they can behaviorally respond to electrical stimulation using structures that have evolved specifically to process electrical information about the world-at best, humans are capable of electrodetection-humans detect electrical potential using the pain, taste, and tactile receptors on the tongue. By considering both the developmental history of an individual and the evolutionary history of its species, we can determine to what forms of energy in the world a putative sense organ has become dedicated.
To consider a concrete example, there are at least three different things that can stimulate a vertebrate eye: (1) photons, (2) mechanical distortion (as when you press the eyeball with a finger), and (3) a properly inserted stimulating electrode (as in a neurophysiological experiment). These are quite clearly three different forms of energy (electromagnetic, mechanical, and electrical, respectively) to which the eye qua sense organ is physiologically responsive (satisfying criteria (1) and (2)). All three types of stimulation can elicit behavior as required by criterion (3). What makes the eye part of a visual system, but not part of a mechanosensory or stimulating-electrode-receptive system, is the evolutionary history of those vertebrates which have eyes. It is this history which determines to what sense a putative sense organ is dedicated. Dedication, in turn, allows us to distinguish those animals which genuinely possess a given sensory modality from those which have figured out a way of using some other sense to make occasional inferences about the world.
At this point, I can finally address an account that has likely bothered some readers by its absence in this discussion: ecological psychology. In The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, J. J. Gibson22 offers a characterization of the senses at odds with many other accounts in psychology. As Heil points out (op. cit., pp. 10-11), Gibson does not directly address Aristotle's and the star-nosed mole problems, but such an account seems implicit in his work (and I shall rely on Heil's explication here). According to Heil, "Gibson's fundamental notion is that perceiving is the picking up of information about the world made available to the perceiver by various sorts of physical stimulation" (op. cit., p. 10). The notion of "information" is critical to the Gibsonian account, and it is at the crux of why I part company with them. Gibsonians hold that it makes sense to attribute a sensory modality to any organism that can act on structured stimuli of a particular physical type regardless of how that information is obtained by the organism. Take the case of a blind person equipped with a video camera and mechanism that converts the visual image into an iso- arbitrary matter" (op. cit., p. 255) . That is to say, relying on the proper objects of sense does not tell us by virtue of what these properties are the proper objects of vision, whereas those properties are the proper objects of touch. Of course, the obvious thing that classes these properties together is that we see the visual ones, and tactually feel the tactile ones. But to invoke this feature is to revert to the sensation criterion. à• A second problem with the proper objects criterion is that it breaks down once you try to put it into practice. That color is a proper object of vision seems uncontroversial.
But is warmth a proper object of the tactile sense? This seems correct until we realize that one can occasionally see the temperature of objects, as when the blacksmith sees that the red glowing metal bar next to the furnace is hot. The clear response to this worry is to draw a distinction between directly sensing temperature (as the tactile sense does) and inferring temperature (as we sometimes do with our visual senses). The proper objects of a sense are those which it directly senses. Grice demonstrates over several pages, however, that we cannot make sense of this suggested distinction without cashing out the notion of "directness" in terms of having a particular qualitative experience; for example, directly sensing warmth is to experience a sensation of warmth, something you get through the tactile sense and never through the visual sense (op. cit., pp.
251-55). Once again, criterion (5) only makes sense by invoking criterion (6).
Given the above arguments, the cogency of criterion (5) rests on the foundation provided by criterion (6). How firm is this foundation? Grice argues that any account of the senses in terms of experiential character of sensation rests, in turn, on an account in terms of proper objects. I want to take a different tack. I accept that a proper object account rests on an account of sensation, but argue that we cannot use the experiential character of sensation to differentiate the senses. Both proper objects and sensations are nonstarters when it comes to solving Aristotle's and the star-nosed mole problems. 27 What is wrong with using the experiential character of sensation as a criterion for individuating the senses? There are two problems with this approach. First, while potentially useful for solving Aristotle's problem, it is less clear what use it is in solving the star-nosed mole problem. Do we have to believe in the existence of electrical qualia, say, before we can sensibly talk of an electrical modality in electric fish or decide whether the star-nosed mole has an electrical modality? It seems to require that we be able to answer Thomas Nagel28 type questions concerning what it is like to be an electric fish or star-nosed mole. This point echoes one made by Coady: "Further difficulties will arise for a Gricean view from the fact that we commonly attribute sight, touch, hearing, etc. to dumb animals and here we not only make no use of [the sensation criterion] but there seems to be no way in which we could" (op. cit., p. 111).
Of course, there is never a guarantee that philosophical analysis will make science easy (or even possible), and we might just have to accept that science cannot answer the star-nosed mole problem until it has overcome the worries raised by Nagel. I think, however, that there are other reasons for rejecting criterion (6) which render Nagel mute on the issue at hand. Grice's proposal runs into problems even with humans, because there is reason to believe that there are legitimate sensory modalities that lack a special introspectible character altogether.
Consider the case of the vomeronasal system. Admittedly, there is still controversy as to whether humans possess this modality, but over the past decade evidence in its favor has begun to mount. Furthermore, if we in fact possess this system, two things about it are striking: first, it plays a significant role in human behavior; and, second, we experience no sensations associated with this modality-there is no "special introspectible character" here, hence no basis to individuate this modality from any other. It would appear to be a modality without sensory experiences.
In almost all vertebrates investigated, airborne chemicals are detected by multiple anatomical systems. One is the well-known system involving the olfactory epithelium within the nasal cavity containing chemosensory cells that project to the olfactory bulb. In humans, this is the system responsible for smell and taste experiences. In most animals, this system is primarily responsible for the detection and evaluation of food. There is a second system, however, that is primarily social in function. The vomeronasal organ is located in a pair of pits on either side of the nasal septum. The vomeronasal system is primarily responsible for detecting pheromones, which in turn have been shown to play a central role in reproductive behavior. 29 For example, animals with lesioned vomeronasal organs typically exhibit greatly reduced sexual behavior. Similarly, artificially stimulating this organ and the nuclei to which it projects generally produces sexual behaviors in the animal so manipulated, even in the absence of appropriate conspecifics.
Do humans have a vomeronasal system? The textbook answer has traditionally been that while this system is present in human fetuses, it disappears during normal development. 30 In recent years, however, this received wisdom has been called into question. 31 In terms of anatomy--contrary to the textbooks-vomeronasal pits are present in most adult humans.32 Furthermore, the pits are innervated by sensory neurons. 33 Behaviorally, there is a growing list of findings in humans that closely resemble behaviors carried out by the vomeronasal system in other species. This, combined with the fact that these behaviors seem to have no conscious correlates, suggests the presence of a nonconscious modality in humans. First, it has been reported that individuals can detect the gender of another based on smelling the breath alone. Some women are reportedly able to identify the gender of a breather with an accuracy of ninety-five percent!34 Second, clinicians have observed that damage to the nerves in the nasal region is often, but not always, associated with a loss of interest in sex. (Because medical students have typically been taught that humans do not have a vomeronasal organ, however, nobody has pursued a study of naturally occurring lesions to the vomeronasal veràê sus olfactory epithelial systems in humans. Therefore, to my knowledge, no attempt has been made to try to tease apart the functions of these two systems, as has been done in nonhuman animals.) While the science is admittedly controversial here, the possibility of a human vomeronasal system stands as a potentially interesting case of a modality without a special introspectible experiential character. Women who can guess the gender of breath do not report that they experience "male" versus "female" qualia associated with the breaths. Indeed, subjects are generally surprised to be informed that they are so good at distinguishing the smells. Gender detection via the putative vomeronasal sense seems akin to an olfactory version of blindsight.35 And if it is a modality that lacks qualia, then criterion (6) cannot even begin to distinguish this modality from others.
Many will no doubt be surprised by the above arguments that the differentiation of the senses is independent of any appeal to the experiences associated with the senses. A commentator36 on an early version of this article put it this way: "Much of the bad press over qualia is well-deserved; but if there is one place experiential qualities have a safe home, I would've thought it would be with the sense modalities." In response, I would say that experiential qualities do have a safe home in the modalities. Much of what we experience, we experience through the senses. My argument here is not that there is no such thing as sensory experience, but rather that we should not use those experiences to differentiate the senses. Experience is often associated with the senses, but its nature does not define the difference between the individual senses.37 has not been forthcoming. On the other hand, the work of Catania (op. cit.) indicates that these same sensory cells are responsive to tactile stimulation and, furthermore, that the range of mechanical stimulation required falls within an ecologically plausible range. With such a nose, a star-nosed mole is able to make all sorts of useful sensory discriminations of the texture, motion, and shape of objects that it places its nose upon. What is more, Catania has done careful comparative studies indicating that the sensory end organs on the nose of the star-nosed mole are likely modified versions of the tactilesensing end organs found in related species of moles, which in turn are modified versions of the basic tactile-sensing end organs found in most mammals, including humans. All of these discoveries point to the conclusion that the nose of a star-nosed mole is properly thought of as a tactile-sensor.
The sort of story told about the star-nosed mole can be used as a template in the cases of all putative sensory modalities in nonhuman animals. If, for example, one wishes to argue for the presence of a magnetic sense in migratory birds or an electrical sense in the platypus, then the same Š set of evidence needs to be collected. One must characterize the target of the sense in physical terms (What range of magnetic stimulation? Exactly what electrical properties?). One must demonstrate via the organisms' behavior that the organisms in question can make use of the alleged sense. One must find a sense organ that can transduce this information from the environment to the CNS of the organism. Finally, one must demonstrate that this organ has the evolutionary or developmental function to carry out such sensory transductions. Only if you do all four of these things can you properly talk of the animal as having the sense in question.
Those are the scientific implications of my account. What of the philosophical ones? If the account that I have presented here is plausible, then it represents a strong, naturalized alternative to the more common-sense approaches to the issues typically favored by philosophers. For the purposes of the perceptual sciences, at least, distinguishing the senses from one another is not a matter of such folk-scientific entities as the proper objects of sensation or some specific qualitative feel of conscious perceptual experience. Strictly speaking, this is not to say that qualia do not exist, but rather that they do not have a role to play in this particular scientific story, however useful they may be to our folk understanding of ourselves. Defenders of qualia need to look elsewhere for scientific legitimacy.
If you are unconvinced with the positive story I have told here, I hope to have at least persuaded you that there are interesting philosophical and scientific questions yet to be answered concerning the differentiation of the senses in humans and other animals. At the same time, I believe I have shown that some of the more intuitive criteria for partitioning our senses run into problems, particularly when it comes to such potentially novel senses as proprioception and the vomeronasal sense, not to mention those of such exotic animals as star-nosed moles and electric fish. The principled extension of common-sense concepts into novel domains is a long-standing project in philosophy. I hope that this discussion has shown that there is still interesting contemporary work to be done on ancient problems.
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